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Abstract. We consider two-round elimination tournaments where
players have ﬁxed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are
suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is
stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the ﬁrst than in the
second round in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation between
two rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. However, if the players
have independent private resources and the success function is deterministic,
then every player spends at least one third of his resources in the ﬁrst round.
The players spend exactly one third of their resources in the winner-take-all
case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussed.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze two-round elimination tournaments in which
players have ﬁxed resources instead of cost functions. In the ﬁrst round players are
matched in two pairs for contests and the winner of each contest proceeds to the next
round. All losers receive the prize, W0, and are eliminated from the tournament.
There is a trade oﬀ here. On the one hand, the more resources a player spends in the
ﬁrst round, the higher her chance to win the current contest and play in the ﬁnal.
On the other hand, the more resources a player spends in the ﬁrst round, the less her
chance to win the ﬁnal. Each player has to allocate optimally her overall resources
between two rounds. This strategic problem is diﬀerent from the problem analyzed
in the contest literature, where players must decide how much eﬀort to spend to win
the prize(s) in one contest; see, for example, Dixit (1987, 1999), Baik and Shogren
(1992), Baye and Shin (1999), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001).
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Several real-world phenomena have the structure of such tournaments. A par-
ticipant in a two-stage election campaign, who has a ﬁxed total budget, plays an
elimination tournament with ﬁxed resources. A new worker (an assistant professor)
at the beginning of his/her career, when he/she has a limited number of working hours
for the whole career, has to distribute optimally those hours. Needless to say, that
many sportsmen, for example, tennis and soccer players, have to allocate optimally
his/her overall energy across all rounds in elimination tournaments, or chess players
have to decide in which rounds he/she should use his/her novelties in elimination
FIDE World Championship.
The tournament literature has focused theoretically, see, for example, Lazear and
Rosen (1981), Rosen (1981, 1986), and empirically, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990),
Knoeber and Thurman (1994), on players’ incentives in tournaments, when players
have some costs for exerting eﬀort. Classical papers Lazear and Rosen (1981) and
Rosen (1981) analyze a stochastic success functions and show that high diﬀerences
in prizes in the last round(s) must provide enough incentives for players to insert the
same eﬀort in all rounds. We show that the equal resource allocation between two
rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case, if the success function is stochastic.
Moreover, in the symmetric equilibrium every player will spend more resources in the
ﬁrst round that in the ﬁnal round, if the prize scheme is diﬀerent from the winner-
take-all. The intuition is straightforward: if a player keeps her resources until the
last round to get higher prizes, then she will be eliminated in the ﬁrst round.
However, if the success function is deterministic - if the player spends more in
the current round than her opponent, then she wins the current round for sure, then
the prediction is diﬀe r e n t .E v e r yp l a y e rs p e n d sa tl e a s to n et h i r do fh e rr e s o u r c e si n
the ﬁrst round, but she can spend more resources in the ﬁnal now. The intuition is
that the players are going to face a strong opponent in the ﬁnal now, because the
opponent is the best in the other pair of the players from the ﬁrst round. Moreover,
in the symmetric monotone equilibrium every player will spend exactly one third of
her resources in the ﬁrst round, if the prize scheme is the winner-take-all. It contrasts
with Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001), where the authors
show that the winner-take-all prize scheme is often the optimal for the principal, who
wants to maximize joint eﬀort of the players.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We consider the stochastic model in
Section 2 and the deterministic model in Section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion.
2. Stochastic Model: The Same Resources
We begin the formal analysis by considering equilibrium behavior in two-round, four
risk-neutral players, elimination tournaments. In round 1 all players are matched in
pairs for ﬁghts/contests, where only two winners of the ﬁrst round continue to ﬁghtPlayers with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments 3
f o rh i g h e rp a y o ﬀsi nt h eﬁnal. All losers get payoﬀ W0, each of them wins 0 contest,
and are eliminated from the tournament. In the ﬁnal, round 2, the winners of the ﬁrst
round, 2 players, are matched in pair for new ﬁght/contest. The winner of the ﬁnal
gets payoﬀ W2 and the loser receives payoﬀ W1. We make the standard assumption
that prizes increase from round to round
A1. 0 ≤ W0 ≤ W1 <W 2.( 1 )
Each player i has an initial ﬁxed resource E, and must decide how to allocate
this resource between two rounds. Denote the spent part of player i’s resource in the
ﬁrst round by xi
1 and in the second round by xi
2.I f p l a y e r i chooses to use a part
xi
k ∈ [0,E] of her resource in k round, k =1 ,2, when her opponent in k round, player
j,s p e n d sap a r tx
j










where g(x)i sap o s i t i v e ,t w i c ed i ﬀerentiable, and increasing function:
A2. g(x) > 0,g
0 (x) > 0, and g
00 (x) ≤ 0 on the interval [0,E]. (3)
We will call the function (2) success function. A pure strategy for player i is a
rule (xi
1,x i
2), which assigns a part of her resources for every round in the tournament,
such that xi
1 + xi
2 = E, xi
k ≥ 0f o ra n yi ∈ {1,...,4} and k ∈ {1,2}.1
We will call the following prize structure
0 ≤ W0 = W1 <W 2
winner-take-all. The main results of the Stochastic Model can be stated now.
2.1. Existence of a symmetric equilibrium. We show ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r ee x i s t s
a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. The properties of the symmetric equilib-
rium are analyzed after that.
Proposition 1. Suppose that assumptions (1) and (3) hold. Then there exists a
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
1Note that the strategy of player i is completely determined by her choice in the ﬁrst round, but
f o rt h ec o n v e n i e n c eo fe x p o s i t i o nw ew i l lw r i t et h es t r a t e g yo fp l a y e ri as her choices in two rounds.Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments 4
Proof: Note ﬁrst that if every player but player 1 plays strategy (y1,y 2), then
player 1 faces one and the same opponent in every round. Given the opponents’
resource allocation (y1,y 2), the player 1’s resource allocation decision x1 in the 1-st














g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)
W2 +
g(E − y1)
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−g0 (E − x1)g(E − y1)
[g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)]









g0 (E − x1)g(E − y1)
[g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)]
2 [W2 − W1]+
g00(x1)[g(x1)+g(y1)]






g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)
[W2 − W1]+[ W1 − W0]
¶
g(y1)+
g00(E − x1)[g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)]
2 − 2[g0 (E − x1)]
2 [g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)]





Since g00 ≤ 0, by assumption (3), then
∂2G(x1,y1)
∂x2
1 ≤ 0 and the continuous payoﬀ
function G is quasi-concave in x1. It means that we can apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point
theorem to the player 1 best reply correspondence. The ﬁxed point is a symmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies. End of proof.Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments 5
2.2. Properties of the symmetric equilibrium. Since Proposition 1 estab-
lishes the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, we can analyze
properties of this equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Suppose that assumptions (1) and (3) hold. Then, in symmetric
equilibrium, (x∗
1,x ∗
2),i tm u s tb ex∗
1 ≥ x∗
2, for any prize structure (W0,W 1,W 2).E q u a l
resource allocation between two rounds, x∗
1 = x∗
2, takes place only in the winner-take-
all case.
Proof: Suppose that all players, but player 1, allocate resource E in the same
way (y1,y 2). Given the opponents’ resource allocation (y1,y 2), the player 1’s resource
allocation decision x1 in the 1 − st round of the tournament is determined by the









g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)






g0 (E − x1)g(E − y1)
[g(E − x1)+g(E − y1)]
2 [W2 − W1]=0
In symmetric equilibrium, x2 = y2 = x∗
2, x1 = y1 = x∗





([W2 − W1]+2[ W1 − W0]) =




[W2 − W1]. (5)
Assumption (3) guarantees that the left-hand side (LHS)i ne q u a t i o n( 5 )i sa
strictly decreasing function of x∗
1 on the interval [0,E], and the right-hand side (RHS)
in the same equation is a strictly increasing function of x∗
1 on the interval [0,E]. It
follows from the fact that g0/g is a strictly decreasing function since g00g − [g0]
2 < 0,
which is a corollary of the assumption (3).
The existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies follows from Propo-
sition 1. Hence, equation (5) either has no solution and x∗
1 = E is a unique pure
strategy symmetric equilibrium or has a unique solution x∗
1 inside of the interval
(0,E), since it deﬁnes the intersection of a decreasing and an increasing continuous
functions. Moreover, in the last case, if x∗











cause of the assumption (1), with equality if and only if W0 = W1.I tm e a n st h a ta
unique solution of the equation (5) must be x∗
1 ≥ E/2. End of proof.
Corollary 1. If the diﬀerence in prizes (W1 − W0) is positive, then the players spend
more resources in the ﬁrst round.Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments 6
Example 1. Suppose that the resource is equal to ten, E =1 0 ;g(x)=1+x;
and the following prize structure, W0 =0 ,W1 =0a n dW2 =3 0 . T h e n ,t h ep a y o ﬀ
function G(x1,5) = 30 1+x
1+x+6
11−x








0 2468 first round spending
Figure 1
The optimal ﬁrst round spending is x1 = 5 as we know from Proposition 2. Figure
1 supports our ﬁnding.
3. Deterministic Model: Independent Private Resources
We consider elimination tournaments in an environment with independently and iden-
tically distributed private values of resources in this section. There are three prizes,
W2 >W 1 ≥ W0 ≥ 0, in the elimination tournament, where W2 is the prize for the
winner of the tournament (she wins two rounds), W1 is the prize for the ﬁnalist (she
wins one round) and W0 is the prize for the loser of the ﬁrst round (she wins no
rounds). There are four players in the elimination tournament. Each player i assigns
ar e s o u r c eo fXi - the maximum amount a player can spend in all rounds of the elim-
ination tournament. A player wins a round if she spends more than her opponent. If
both players spend the same amount, then each of them has ﬁfty percent chance to
be the winner of the round. Each Xi is independently and identically distributed on
some interval [0,E], E<∞, according to the increasing distribution function F.I t
is assumed that F admits a continuous density f ≡ F0 and has full support.
Ap l a y e ri knows the realization xi of Xi and only that the other players’ resources
are independently distributed according to F. Players are risk neutral and maximizePlayers with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments 7
their expected proﬁts. The distribution function F is common knowledge. A strategy
for a player i is a function βi =( β1
i ,β2
i ):[ 0 ,E] → [0,E]
2, which determines her





i ≡ xi. (6)
We will be interested in the outcomes of a symmetric equilibrium - an equilibrium in
which all players follow the same strategy.
We assume that the player 1 plays with the player 2 and the player 3 plays with
the player 4 in the ﬁrst round, each player i simultaneously spends amount β1
i in the







































Every player faces a simple trade oﬀ.A ni n c r e a s ei ns p e n d i n gi nt h eﬁrst round will
increase the probability to win the ﬁrst round and play in the ﬁnal, at the same time
reducing the probability to win the ﬁnal. To get some idea about how these eﬀects
balance oﬀ, we begin with a derivation of symmetric equilibrium strategies.
Suppose that players j 6= 1 follow the symmetric, increasing and diﬀerentiable
equilibrium strategy β∗ = β =( β1,β2). Suppose that the player 1 receives a resource,
X1 = x, and spends b1 in the ﬁrst round and b2 in the second round. We wish to
determine the optimal spending b =( b1,b 2).
First, notice that it can never be optimal to choose b1 > β1 (w) since in that case,
player 1 would win the ﬁrst round for sure and could do better by reducing her ﬁrst
round spending slightly so that she still wins for sure but increases her chance to win
the ﬁnal. So we need only to consider b1 ≤ β1 (w). Second, a player with resource 0
must have β (0) = (β1 (0),β2 (0)) = (0,0).
The player 1 wins the ﬁrst round whenever she spends more than the player 2
does, that is, whenever β1
2 (X2) <b 1. The player 1 wins the tournament whenever
she wins the ﬁrst round, β1
2 (X2) <b 1, and the second round, that is, whenever she
spends more in the second round than the winner of the ﬁrst round pair the player 3
and the player 4, that is, whenever b2 > β2
34 (X3,X 4), where β2
34 (X3,X 4) is the second
round spending of the winner of the ﬁrst round pair the player 3 and the player 4.



































where F2 is the distribution function of Y34, the highest second round spending of
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−1¢W0 =0 . ( 8 )































































[β2 (x − b1)]










−1¢W0 =0 . ( 9 )























W0 =0 . ( 1 0 )
Using (6), we obtain
β
10 + β
20 ≡ 1. (11)
































F2 (x)[W2 − W1]+[ W1 − W0]
3F2 (x)[W2 − W1]+[ W1 − W0]
.





F2 (s)[W2 − W1]+[ W1 − W0]

































.( 1 4 )
The derivation of the function β is only heuristic because (12) is merely a necessary
condition - we have not formally established that if the other three players follow β,
then it is indeed optimal for a player with resource x to spend β1 (x)i nt h eﬁrst
round. The following proposition veriﬁes that this is indeed correct.
Deﬁnition. L e tas e to fp a i r s{y,z | x} = Ω(x) ∈ R2 b et h es e to ft h es o l u t i o n s
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Proposition 3. Suppose that, function F and constant c are such that for all x ∈
[0,E], (x,x) ∈ Ω(x). A symmetric equilibrium of the elimination tournament is given
by the function β =( β1,β2) deﬁned as (13) and (14).
Proof: Suppose that all but the player 1 follow the strategy β∗ ≡ β =( β1,β2)
given in (13) and (14). We will argue that in that case it is optimal for the player 1
to follow β also. First, notice that β is an increasing and continuous function. Thus,
in equilibrium the player with the highest resource spends more in both rounds and
wins the tournament. Denote γ = β1 and η = β2. It is never optimal for the player 1
t os p e n da na m o u n tb1 > γ (w)i nt h eﬁrst round. The expected payoﬀ of the player 1
with the resource x if she spends b1 ≤ γ (w)i nt h eﬁrst round is calculated as follows.
Denote by y = γ−1 (b1)a n dz = η−1 (b2)=η−1 (x − γ (y)) the resources for which b1
and b2 are the equilibrium bids in the ﬁrst and the second rounds, that are, γ (y)=b1
and η(z)=b2.T h e nw ec a nw r i t et h ep l a y e r1 ’ se x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ from spending γ (y)
in the ﬁrst round and η(z) in the second round when her resource is x as follows:










+( 1− F (y))W0
= F (z)F

























γ (y)+η(z)=x.( 1 5 )
Since, by assumption, (x,x) ∈ Ω(x), for all x,t h e nπ(x,x | x) − π(y,z | x) ≥ 0f o r
all y and z such that the equality (15) holds. End of proof.
Example 2. Suppose that c =0 ,o rW0 = W1 =0 ,E =1a n dF (x)=x.F i n d
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or
z = x and y = x for any x ∈ [0,E].











We consider two-round elimination tournaments, where risk-neutral players have ﬁxed
resources. Two approaches are analyzed: stochastic and deterministic. In the sto-
chastic model all players spend more resources in the ﬁrst than in the second round
in the symmetric equilibrium. The intuition is straightforward: the expected payoﬀs
are higher in the ﬁrst than in the second round of the tournament. The same reason-
ing is valid for Rosen’s (1986) model, where players have costs for exerting eﬀort in
every round instead of ﬁxed resources. Rosen (1986) shows that prizes must increase
over rounds to provide enough incentives for players to exert the same eﬀort in every
round, if players have trade oﬀ b e t w e e nc o s t sa n de x p e c t e dh i g hf u t u r ep a y o ﬀs. In our
model, if a principal/designer of the tournament wants players to allocate resources
equally in two rounds, then he must implement the winner-take-all prize scheme.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) analyze a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes
with deterministic relation between eﬀort and output. They show that the winner-
take-all is the optimal prize scheme, if cost functions are linear or concave in eﬀort.
Deterministic assumption should be contrasted with stochastic result of a contest
in every round of the tournament in Rosen (1986) and the stochastic model of this
paper. Moreover, our results for the deterministic model are diﬀerent not only from
the results for the stochastic model, but also from Moldovanu and Sela (2001). If the
principal wants to maximize joint spending in the deterministic model, then he should
make the diﬀerence W1 − W0 as high as possible and never use the winner-take-all
scheme.
Although elimination tournaments are usually associated with sports: tennis, soc-
cer and chess, for example, there are many applications for hierarchy in a ﬁrm, acad-
emic career, and election campaigns as well. This simple model helps to explain why
a na s s i s t a n tp r o f e s s o rm u s tw o r kh a r d e ra tt he beginning of his/her career, tennis
a n ds o c c e rp l a y e r sh a v et oe x e r tal o to fe ﬀort at the beginning of an elimination
tournament, and why new workers spend all day long in their oﬃces.
Some work has been done to test predictiono fL a z e a ra n dR o s e n( 1981) theory, see
for example Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Knoeber and Thurman (1994). It
will be interesting to test the relationship between prizes/relative prizes and allocation
of players’ resources in experimental and nonexperimental frameworks.Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments 12
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